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A Multi-Agent Simulation of Primate Social Concepts
Se´bastien Picault1
Abstract. In this paper, we present both an overview of our work on
Primate Societies simulation, and our preliminary results with a first
Social Cognition model. We first show the close connection between
the complexity of social organization among primates and classical
issues of Distributed AI or Multi-Agent Systems design. Then, we
describe our Cognition Model, in which we assume that some so-
cial concepts should be reproduced by focusing on the interactions
between the agents, instead of using an individual-based model. Fi-
nally, we discuss our results and propose extensions and applications
to Multi-Agent Systems design.
1 FROM PRIMATE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
TO DAI’S ISSUES
In this section, we show the relation between primate social compe-
tences and common issues of Distributed AI.
1.1 Primate social competences
Unlike most other species, primates (especially Monkeys and Apes)
have the cognitive capacity to recognize social relations between
their conspecifics ([3] demonstrates this capacity). These relations
are for instance kinship, dominance (which shapes the social struc-
ture of the group, usually a linear, or transitive, hierarchy), or affili-
ation (which allows mutual assistance).
Because of this social perception, primates can form coalitions
to consolidate or overthrow the social structure. Thus, unlike other
species, the social hierarchy does not only depend on physical power,
but mostly on alliance networks. These networks emerge from affil-
iative links, through a reinforcement process: the probability of hav-
ing an affiliative interaction with a conspecific (typically, a “groom-
ing” activity) correlates with the duration of past interactions of the
same kind. Moreover, primates do not only fight to shape the social
structure: dominant individuals can use threat signals, to which their
dominated conspecifics must respond with submissions ones.
A few species exhibit more complex behaviours, such as “tactical
deception”, which is defined by Byrne and Whiten [2] as “acts from
the normal repertoire of the agent, deployed such that another indi-
vidual is likely to misinterpret what the acts signify, to the advantage
of the agent”.
1.2 From primates to agents
We can now see that primate social organization addresses the fol-
lowing issues, which are very close to DAI’s:
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 How can concepts (such as “dominance” or “affiliation”) emerge
from interactions between agents, or how to build a symbolic rep-
resentation of the conspecifics ?
 Which mechanisms are implied in coalitions or alliances forma-
tion ? This is a highly challenging point in order to design dynam-
ical methods for team work, cooperation, coordination in Multi-
Agent Systems.
 Which cognitive abilities are required to produce deceptive be-
haviours ? “Innate” behaviour rules (for instance, as a product of
Natural Selection), or a Theory of Mind ? The understanding of
deception could provide DAI with mechanisms to prevent or fight
fraud in Multi-Agent Systems.
To answer these questions, we prefer to start our work on so-
cial cognition simulation by testing parsimony hypotheses regarding
social cognition models, in order to find quite simple mechanisms
which could be used to shape the organization in other Multi-Agent
Systems. In the following section, we report the firsts results of such
an approach.
2 A DISTRIBUTED COGNITION MODEL TO
SIMULATE SOCIAL CONCEPTS
2.1 Our hypotheses
Byrne [1] and Worden [9] propose a symbolic learning theory for
social complex behaviours, but it only focuses on a single agent.
According to Occam’s Razor, we prefer, as far as possible, to start
with very simple agents, attaching importance to their interactions
(instead of their internal structure), to produce complex collective
behaviours. We should not increase their individual complexity until
such a model proves incomplete.
We assume in our work that the distinction between three organi-
zation levels reduces the complexity of the study. These levels (de-
fined by Collinot’s Cassiopeia Method [4]) are a domain-dependent
one (responsible for individual competences), a relational one (in-
volved in affiliation or dominance), and an organizational one (al-
lowing coalitions and alliances).
2.2 Social cognition: the pheromone model
Our work uses a simulation platform in which the behaviours of the
agents, called tasks, are fixed action patterns, with preconditions (see
[7] for more details).
Insects lay down or diffuse molecules in the environment to share
information about “domain-dependent problems” (such as foraging,
nest building, eggs care), and such “reactive” mechanisms can be
used in problem-solving [5, 6]. In the same way, the model we
propose uses the environment as a social medium, defining “social
pheromones” as follows:
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A given social interaction is linked with a particular kind of stimu-
lus, called “social pheromone”, which is emitted in the environment;
this stimulus, when perceived by an agent, causes a modification in
his relational and/or organizational behaviours or knowledges.
The purpose of this model is to reproduce the recognition of social
proto-concepts; for instance, the dominance relation. In this context,
each agent diffuses a social pheromone (called “rank”) and, instead
of memorizing fight outcomes, he maintains sensitivity thresholds to
his conspecifics’ stimuli (see figure 1). The intensity of the emitted
stimulus is the average of the sensitivity thresholds, thus we ensure
a direct feedback between the threshold set and the corresponding
stimulus of an agent.
When an agent perceives a dominance stimulus, he compares its
intensity to the threshold allocated to its emitter, and the result deter-
mines the agent’s relational behaviour: if the stimulus is low enough,
then the agent acts as he would dominate the pheromone’s emitter.
Therefore, the higher an agent’s thresholds are, the less the agent
responds to his conspecifics’ stimuli; at the same time, his own stim-
ulus has a strong intensity, and probably a great impact on the other
agents.
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Figure 1. This graph illustrates an agent’s social representations of his
conspecifics (abscissa: a1–a6). Each agent maintains such a set of sensitivity
thresholds to determine wether or not he dominates his conspecifics, i.e.
wether or not he reacts to his conspecifics’ “rank” stimulus. The average of
these thresholds gives the intensity of the agent’s own dominance
pheromone.
When a domain-dependent role has an influence on relational
roles, the thresholds are being adjusted according to the outcome
of the interactions. For instance, when a fight occurs, the winner
(W ) and the loser (L) modify their respective thresholds: T
W
(L) in-
creases while T
L
(W ) decreases (where T
i
(j) refers to agent i’s sen-
sitivity threshold toward agent j’s dominance stimulus). The ampli-
tude of the correction is proportional to the former threshold for the
loser, and inversely proportional to it for the winner. Therefore, the
outcomes of interindividual interactions have an additional influence
on the intensity of the winner’s and the loser’s emitted pheromone,
so that their conspecifics may be sensitive to it.
Thus, no individual representation is the mirror of the whole social
structure, but the interaction between them makes it emerge. That is
why this model is a Distributed Social Representation.
3 RESULTS, DISCUSSION, FUTURE WORK
In this section, we report our results and propose applications of our
work in other Multi-Agent Systems. More details about our experi-
ments are given in [8].
3.1 Results and interpretation
With our model, the agents succeed in estimating the rank of their
conspecifics, even if they have very few interactions with them. We
also show that “erroneous social beliefs”, due to insufficient updat-
ing, are responsible for new fights and thus modification of the social
structure. In fact, two concepts are modelled: “prejudice” (under the
meaning of “erroneous social beliefs” due to unsufficient updating),
and “self-confidence” (a positive feedback that doesn’t act directly on
the outcome of conflicts but on relational knowledge).These results
seem to confirm our hypotheses regarding the distinction of organi-
zation levels and the relevance of a pheromone-like model to process
relational information.
3.2 Future work
For the moment, we have focused on one aspect of social cognition,
which is enough to confirm some hypotheses but is too restrictive
to provide a real simulation of primate societies. Now, we have to
extend our work through three directions: first, our social cognition
model is to be experimented more widely on other relational roles
and compared to biological facts. The second point would be to ab-
stract some of our simulation mechanisms to propose engineering
principles which could be implemented into other multi-agent sys-
tems. Finally, social phenomena simulation raises stakes that go far
beyond biology. In fact, complex behaviours, such as tactical decep-
tion, could interest economical or political simulations, since primate
behaviours are very close to human ones in this very domain. The
simulation of primate social behaviours not only allows to test bio-
logical hypotheses and understand collective behaviours, but also has
repercussions on other fields in social sciences.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This Ph.D. research is supervised by Anne Collinot (LIP6/CNRS)
and supported by a grant from the French Department of Higher Ed-
ucation and Research.
REFERENCES
[1] Richard W. Byrne, ‘A formal notation to aid analysis of complex be-
haviour: Understanding the tactical deception of primates’, Behaviour,
(127 (3–4)), 231–246, (1993).
[2] Richard W. Byrne and Andrew Whiten, Machiavellian Intelligence: so-
cial expertise and the evolution of intellect in monkeys, apes and humans,
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
[3] Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, ‘Vocal recognition in free-
ranging vervet monkeys’, Animal Behavior, (30), 362–367, (1980).
[4] Anne Collinot, Alexis Drogoul, and Philippe Benhamou, ‘Agent-
Oriented Design of a Soccer Robot Team’, Proceedings of ICMAS’96,
(1996).
[5] Alexis Drogoul, ‘When Ants Play Chess (Or Can Strategies Emerge
From Tactical Behaviors?)’, From Reaction to Cognition, Lectures Notes
in AI 957, Springer Verlag, 13–27, (1995).
[6] Alexis Drogoul and Christophe Dubreuil, ‘A Distributed Approach to
N-Puzzle Solving’, Proceedings of the Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Workshop, (1993).
[7] Steffen Lalande, Alexis Drogoul, and Bernard Thierry, ‘MACACA: a
Multi-Agent Computer simulation of Animal Communities based on Al-
liances’, Proceedings of Simulating Societies Symposium, (1995).
[8] Se´bastien Picault and Anne Collinot, ‘Designing Social Cognition Mod-
els for Multi-Agent Systems through Simulating Primate Societies’, Pro-
ceedings of ICMAS’98, (1998).
[9] Robert P. Worden, ‘Primate Social Intelligence’, Cognitive Science, (20),
579–616, (1996).
Distributed AI and Multiagent Systems 328 S. Picault
